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Abstract—In this paper we study recent reaction attacks
against QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based cryptosystems,
which allow an opponent to recover the private parity-check
matrix through its distance spectrum by observing a sufficiently
high number of decryption failures. We consider a special class
of codes, known as monomial codes, to form private keys
with the desirable property of having a unique and complete
distance spectrum. We verify that for these codes the problem of
recovering the secret key from the distance spectrum is equivalent
to that of finding cliques in a graph, and use this equivalence
to prove that current reaction attacks are not applicable when
codes of this type are used in the McEliece cryptosystem.
Index Terms—Code-based cryptography, McEliece cryptosys-
tem, monomial codes, QC-LDPC codes, QC-MDPC codes, reac-
tion attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Devising efficient and robust post-quantum public-key cryp-
tosystems for key encapsulation and encryption is an important
and urgent research target, as also witnessed by the recent
NIST call for post-quantum cryptographic systems [1]. As
recognized by NIST [2], code-based cryptosystems are among
the most promising candidates to replace systems relying on
the hardness of factorizing large integers or solving discrete
logarithms, like Diffie-Hellman, RSA and ElGamal, which
can be broken in polynomial time using Shor’s algorithm
[3] running on a quantum computer. Instead, no quantum
algorithm is known to quickly solve the problem of decoding
a random-like linear block code, that hence remains a non-
polynomial (NP) time problem [4], [5].
The first code-based public-key cryptosystem was proposed
by McEliece in 1978 [6], and relied on Goppa codes [7] to
form the secret key. This yields large public keys, that is
the main limitation of Goppa code-based systems. Replacing
Goppa codes with other families of more structured codes
may allow reducing the public key size; an overview of these
variants can be found in [8]. Among them, a prominent role
is played by variants based on codes with sparse parity-check
matrices [9], [10]. Recently, however, some new statistical
attacks against such variants have been devised, exploiting
Bob’s reactions to gather information about the secret key [11],
[12]. These attacks exploit the fact that probabilistic iterative
decoders are used, which are not bounded-distance decoders.
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Therefore, it may happen that decoding fails to correct some
vector of intentional errors used during encryption, and in such
a case Bob must communicate the decoding failure. In the
attacks proposed in [11], [12], Eve impersonates Alice and
sends multiple suitably chosen ciphertexts to Bob, observing
his reactions. In particular, based on Bob reactions, she esti-
mates Bob’s decoding failure rate (DFR). By exploiting the
dependence of the DFR on some features of the error vectors
used during encryption, Eve is able to understand whether
some particular binary patterns belong to the secret key or not.
By collecting this information, Eve may be able to recover
a representation of the private code that allows decoding of
intercepted cyphertexts.
In this paper, we consider a special family of quasi-cyclic
low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) codes, known as mono-
mial codes, to form the secret key. We extend the attacks
proposed in [11], [12] to this family of codes. We show
that, as in [12], also in this case the secret matrix recovery
problem can be translated into a graph problem. We then
introduce a special class of monomial codes to form the secret
key which make all the known reaction attacks infeasible,
since they do not allow obtaining any useful information from
Bob’s reactions. In particular, we show that for these codes
such attacks reduce to a brute force attack, having only one
solution among a very large set of possible candidates. This
is achieved at the cost of some increase in the public key
size, which is larger for monomial code-based systems with
respect to classical systems based on QC-LDPC and quasi-
cyclic moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes.
II. QC-LDPC / QC-MDPC CODE-BASED MCELIECE
CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Existing McEliece cryptosystem variants based on QC-
LDPC [9] and QC-MDPC [10] codes exploit codes with rate
R = n0−1
n0
, being n0 a small integer, redundancy p, length
n = n0p and dimension k = (n0 − 1)p. The secret code is
defined by the sparse parity-check matrix
H = [H0,H1, . . . ,Hn0−1] , (1)
where each block Hi is a binary circulant matrix with size
p × p. The private key is formed by H in (1) and two non-
singular random matrices: a k×k scrambling matrix S and an
n× n transformation matrix Q. S and Q are both formed by
p× p circulant blocks, and Q is a sparse matrix with average
row and column weight m ≥ 1.
The QC-MDPC code-based case is different from the QC-
LDPC code-based case in that H is less sparse and Q is
reduced to an identity matrix (hence m = 1). Moreover,
when an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2) secure
conversion of these systems is used [13], S can also be
reduced to an identity matrix. The public key is obtained as
G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1, whereG is a systematic generator matrix
for the code defined by H. Alice performs encryption by first
dividing the secret message into k-bit blocks. For any of these
blocks, say u, a weight-t binary error vector e is generated
and the corresponding ciphertext block x is computed as
x = u ·G′ + e = c+ e. (2)
To perform decryption, Bob multiplies x by Q and obtains
x′ = x ·Q = u · S−1 ·G+ e ·Q = u′ ·G+ e′, (3)
where u′ ·G = c′ is a codeword of the secret code correspond-
ing to the information vector u′ = u · S−1, while e′ = e ·Q
plays the role of an error vector with weight t′ ≤ mt. Bob
then corrects e′ through iterative decoding and gets c′. Owing
to the systematic form of G, u is obtained by discarding the
last p entries of c′ and multiplying the remaining vector by S.
In the QC-MDPC code-based variant with CCA2 secure
conversion, the matrices S andQ can be avoided (i.e., replaced
by identity matrices); with this choice, we have G′ =G.
III. REACTION ATTACKS
The attacks introduced in [11], [12] exploit the fact that, in
the QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based systems, decryption
may fail with a certain DFR. Moreover, the DFR depends on
the number of couples of ones that are in the same positions
in e and in the rows of H and Q (when the latter is used).
Hence, Eve can adopt the following attack strategy:
1) she generates a sufficiently large number of plaintext-
error vector pairs, computes the corresponding ciphertexts
and sends them to Bob;
2) she classifies the produced ciphertexts into appropriate
subsets, depending on the error vector structure, and waits
for the corresponding decryption outcome;
3) using the observed reactions, she estimates the individual
DFR over each subset.
Then, the DFR values of the subsets can be analyzed to obtain
information about the structure ofH (andQ, when used). This
information can be used to reconstruct a sparse parity-check
matrix Hˆ = Π · H · QT , where Π is a p × p permutation
matrix, which can be employed to efficiently decode x and
recover e. Indeed, we have
sˆ = Hˆ · xT = Hˆ ·G′T · uT + Hˆ · eT = (4)
= Π ·H ·GT · (S−1)T · uT + Hˆ · eT = Hˆ · eT ,
as H ·GT = 0 by definition. Thus, sˆ is the syndrome of e
computed through Hˆ, which is a sparse matrix (since both
H and Q are sparse). In the QC-MDPC case, Hˆ is just a
row-permuted version of the secret parity-check matrix H.
The opponent can then consider Hˆ, apply efficient syndrome
decoding on sˆ and recover e. Since the rows of Hˆ are a
permuted version of those of H, we define them as row-
equivalent matrices.
The mentioned reaction attacks are based on the concept of
distance spectrum, which is the set of all distances existing
between any two ones in a binary vector (cyclically closed).
Given two ones at positions v1 and v2, the corresponding
distance is computed as
δ(v1, v2) = min {±(v1 − v2) mod p}. (5)
In a circulant matrix A, all rows produce the same distances;
so, we can define its distance spectrum Λ(A) as the distance
spectrum of whichever row of A (say the first one). Once the
distance spectrum is known, the corresponding vector can be
easily recovered, apart from a cyclic permutation. In reaction
attacks, Eve first obtains the distance spectrum of the secret
key, and then uses it to recover Hˆ. This will be described, with
reference to monomial codes, in the next section. The recovery
problem might have more than one solution, meaning that Eve
might obtain more than one candidate for Hˆ. However, as
shown in [11], [12], for conventional codes the number of
candidates is typically small.
IV. MONOMIAL CODES IN THE MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM
Let us consider a secret code defined by a parity-check
matrix in the form
H =


H0,0 H0,1 · · · H0,n0−1
H1,0 H1,1 · · · H1,n0−1
...
...
. . .
...
Hr0−1,0 Hr0−1,1 · · · Hr0−1,n0−1

 (6)
where each block Hi,j is a p×p circulant permutation matrix,
which can be represented as a monomial xwi,j according to the
classical homomorphism between p×p circulant matrices and
polynomials modulo xp − 1. Thus, the secret code has length
n = n0p. It is easy to show that a matrix in the form (6) has at
least r0−1 rows that are linearly dependent on the other rows.
Hence, the dimension of the private code is k ≥ k0p+ r0− 1,
being k0 = n0−r0, which usually holds with the equality sign
for non-trivial choices of the matrix entries. To avoid attacks
like the one in [14], we choose p as a prime. We point out
that such matrices can be completely described by an r0×n0
matrix W, often denoted as the exponent matrix of H, whose
elements wi,j are the exponents of the monomials in (6).
Let us suppose to use these codes, in place of those
described by (1), within the schemes discussed in Section II.
A generator matrix G can be easily obtained from (6) in the
form of k0 × n0 circulant blocks having size p× p, with the
addition of n−k−r0p rows to compensate the rank deficiency
of H in (6) [8]. These rows, however, do not depend on the
exponents of H. Hence, when G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1 is used as
the public key, they can be excluded and, considering G′ in
systematic form, storing k0 × r0 circulant blocks having size
p× p requires Ks = r0k0p bits.
A. Reaction attacks to monomial codes
For matrices in the form (6), distances involve only ones
belonging to different circulant blocks in the same row. We
point out that the values of these distances can equally be
obtained considering the exponent matrixW. As for the codes
considered in [11], [12], overlapping ones between e and one
row of H cause a variation in the DFR. However, since the
parity-check matrix of a monomial code contains multiple
rows of circulant blocks, an opponent does not know which
of them caused such an effect.
In order to understand this fact, it is useful to write the
error vector in quasi-cyclic (QC) form (i.e., divided into p-bit
blocks), that is e = [e0, e1, · · · , en0−1]. Its syndrome through
H is then s = [s0, s1, · · · , sr0−1], with
si =
n0−1∑
j=0
ejH
T
i,j . (7)
Every time e and (at least) one row of H have overlapping
ones, a cancellation occurs in (7); thus, we can state that
the variation in the DFR is related to the number of such
cancellations. Since the whole error vector contributes to the
computation of every block si, Eve cannot know the positions
of blocks where cancellations occurred.
In order to extend the attack in [11] to monomial codes,
Eve can:
1) define the vectors a(i,j) =
[
a
(i,j)
0 , a
(i,j)
1 , · · · , a(i,j)⌊ p2⌋
]
and
b(i,j) =
[
b
(i,j)
0 , b
(i,j)
1 , · · · , b(i,j)⌊p2 ⌋
]
, for i = 0, · · · , n0 − 2,
j = i+1, · · · , n0− 1, which are initialized with all-zero
elements;
2) generate a sufficiently large set (in the order of millions,
as observed in [11], [12]) of plaintext-error vector pairs;
3) for each plaintext-error vector pair:
a) compute the support of e, noted as Ψe =
{i0, i1, · · · , it−1};
b) encrypt the plaintext using e and send it to Bob;
c) for each couple (i, j) of indexes in Ψe, compute zi =⌊
i
p
⌋
, zj =
⌊
j
p
⌋
;
d) if zi 6= zj , compute d = δ(i, j) and increment b(zi,zj)d ;
in case of a decoding failure, increment a
(zi,zj)
d .
Every time ei and ej have two ones at distance d, b
(zi,zj)
d
gets incremented, while a
(zi,zj)
d gets incremented only in
case of a decoding failure. Then, as done in [11], [12], the
distribution of the ratios
a
(zi,zj)
d
b
(zi,zj)
d
can be analyzed to guess
distances in W (and so, in H). Thus, for these codes the
distance spectrum Λ(W) can be defined as an array formed by
the sets λij(W), each one containing the r0 distances between
the exponents in the i-th and j-th columns. From now on, we
assume, pessimistically, that by using the described procedure
Eve completely knows Λ(W).
B. Matrix recovery from the distance spectrum
Let us describe how the knowledge of Λ(W) might be
exploited to recover the structure of W. First of all, we point
out that Eve is interested in whichever row-permuted version
Hˆ of H; thus, she can simplify the problem, searching for a
Wˆ with the first column made of all-zero entries. This will be
called the standard form of the exponent matrix, and denoted
as W∗. As done in [12], the matrix recovery problem can be
related to the problem of finding cliques in a graph G, which
is associated to the distance spectrum and can be constructed
according to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Construction of G
G ← graph with node 0
for j = 0, 1, · · · , n0 − 1 do
for d ∈ λ0,j(W) do
for b = 0, 2, · · · , 2r0 − 2 do
z
(b)
j = (j − 1)p+ [(p− d) mod p]
z
(b+1)
j = (j − 1)p+ d
Augment G with nodes z(b)j , z(b+1)j
Augment G with edges
(
0, z
(b)
j
)
,
(
0, z
(b+1)
j
)
for i = 1, · · · , n0 − 2 do
for j = i+ 1, · · · , n0 − 1 do
for bi = 0, 1, · · · , 2r0 − 1 do
for bj = 0, 1, · · · , 2r0 − 1 do
if δ
(
z
(bi)
i , z
(bj)
j
)
∈ λi,j then
Augment G with edge
(
z
(bi)
i , z
(bj)
j
)
Each n0-clique in G containing the node 0 represents a
possible solution for one row of W∗, in the sense that
the corresponding distances are compliant with Λ(W). We
point out that, for every clique Γ = {γ0, γ1, · · · , γn0−1},
the graph contains also the clique Γ∗, with elements γ∗i =
p
⌊
γi
p
⌋
+[(p− γi) mod p]. This property can be easily proven
by verifying that the application of (5) to every couple of nodes
in Γ and Γ∗ produces the same set of distances; thus, since
every row inW∗ corresponds to two cliques in G, the number
of n0-cliques in the graph cannot be lower than 2r0.
C. Monomial codes with identical distance spectra
Let us introduce a special class of monomial codes, de-
signed with the goal of maximizing the number of candidates
which can be obtained by the matrix recovery procedure.
Basically, the idea is to carefully choose the exponents of the
monomials inH, in order to obtain a distance spectrum Λ(W)
such that
λi,j(W) =
{
0, 1, 2, · · · ,
⌊p
2
⌋}
∀i, j. (8)
A matrix with this feature can be obtained by the procedure
reported next. The resulting matrix has r0 =
⌈
p
2
⌉
, n0 = p and
a constant row weight equal to n0 =
√
n, which is typical of
QC-MDPC codes.
Exponent matrix construction
1) Randomly pick y = [y0, y1, · · · , yr0−1], where yi is an
integer ∈ [0; p− 1];
2) randomly pick a permutation v = [v0, v1, · · · , vp−1] of
the vector [0, 1, · · · , p− 1];
3) randomly pick a permutation q = [q0, q1, · · · , qr0−1] of
the vector
[
0, 1, · · · , ⌊p2⌋];
4) for i = 0, 1, · · · , n0 − 1, compute the i-th column of W
as
yT + viq
T mod p. (9)
Theorem IV.1 Let W be a matrix constructed according to
the above procedure; then, (8) holds.
Proof. The image of δ(i, j) contains the
⌈
p
2
⌉
integers in
the range
[
0;
⌊
p
2
⌋]
; since each set λi,j(W) contains r0 =
⌈
p
2
⌉
elements, to prove the theorem it is sufficient to demonstrate
that, for each couple of columns (i, j), no duplicated distances
can exist in λi,j(W). Let us consider two columns, identified
by the indexes i and j, and two rows, identified by the indexes
l and m; the corresponding exponents inW will be wl,i, wl,j ,
wm,i and wm,j . Because of the structure of W, we have
wl,i = yl + viql mod p,
wl,j = yl + vjql mod p,
wm,i = ym + viqm mod p,
wm,j = ym + vjqm mod p.
Let us consider the exponents in the l-th row: we have wl,i −
wl,j ≡ (vi − vj)ql ≡ ∆i,jql mod p. For the m-th row, in the
same way, we have wm,i − wm,j ≡ ∆i,jqm mod p. Since v
is a permutation of the integers from 0 to p− 1, it is easy to
see that ∆i,j ∈ [−p+1;−1]∪ [1; p− 1], so ∆i,j 6≡ 0 mod p.
We must now prove that δ(wl,i, wl,j) 6= δ(wm,i, wm,j), i.e.,
min {±∆i,jql mod p} 6= min {±∆i,jqm mod p}. (10)
First of all, ±∆i,jql ≡ ±∆i,jqm mod p can only be satisfied
if ql ≡ qm mod p, which is not possible since the values in
q are all distinct and smaller than p. So, we must consider the
case of ±∆i,jql ≡ ∓∆i,jqm mod p, which gives ±∆i,j(ql+
qm) ≡ 0 mod p. This relation cannot be satisfied as well,
since 0 < ql + qm < 2
⌊
p
2
⌋
= p− 1.
It can be easily proven that an exponent matrix satisfying (8)
is associated to a graph having pn0−1 cliques of size n0; it can
also be proven that this number corresponds to the maximum
number of cliques which can exist in a graph constructed
according to Algorithm 1. In addition, we must consider that
all the matrices constructed according to the above procedure
have the same distance spectrum, and thus share the same
graph G. Hence, performing a reaction attack like the one
described in section IV-A is pointless: the distance spectrum
is no longer secret, but there is no way to distinguish among
all the possible candidates for W∗. Thus, the reaction attack
is reduced to a brute-force attack: Eve keeps on generating
and testing matrices in the form of W∗, until a valid one
is found out. This search is facilitated by the fact that each
row-permuted version of W∗ is acceptable: indeed, the i-th
column of W∗ can be written as:
w∗Ti = w
T
0 + viq
T −wT0 − v0qT mod p = (11)
= (vi − v0)qT mod p =
= v∗i q
T mod p,
where wT0 is the first column of W and v
∗
i = vi− v0 mod p
(so v∗0 = 0). The vector v
∗ =
[
v∗0 , v
∗
1 , · · · , v∗n0−1
]
corresponds
to a permutation of the integers {0, 1, · · · , p− 1}, having 0 as
its first element. Eve is just looking for a matrix Wˆ∗ which is
row-equivalent toW∗, so she can fix the order of the elements
of q and only try different configurations of v∗. Since there
are (p − 1)! possible configurations for v∗, this means that
there are NW = (p − 1)! possibilities for Wˆ∗. We point out
that this number is very large even for small values of p: as
an example, for p = 26 we have (p− 1)! ≈ 283.7.
To conclude our analysis, we must consider the occurrence
of two different row-equivalent matrices W∗: in this case,
also the corresponding parity-check matrices would be row-
equivalent and could be used to decode the same code.
However, by the following theorems we prove that such a
case cannot occur; thus, once a pair of private-public keys is
generated, there can only be one matrixW∗ allowing decoding
of intercepted ciphertexts.
Theorem IV.2 Let p be a prime, and let z =
[z0, z1, · · · , zp−2] be a permutation of the integers in the range
[1; p−1]; then, the sets ℑ(α, z) = {αzi | i = 0, 1, · · · , p− 2},
for α = 1, 2, · · · , p − 1, are all distinct permutations of the
integers in the range [1; p− 1].
Proof. Based on combinatorial arguments and omitted due
to lack of space.
Theorem IV.3 Let p be a prime, and let α be an integer such
that 2 ≤ α ≤ ⌊ p2⌋; then, there always exists an integer β such
that 2 ≤ β ≤ ⌊p2⌋ and αβ mod p > ⌊p2⌋.
Proof. Based on combinatorial arguments and omitted due
to lack of space.
Theorem IV.4 LetW(0) andW(1) be two exponent matrices
generated according to the previous procedure, with v(0) 6=
v(1), and let W∗(0) and W∗(1) denote their corresponding
standard forms. Then, W∗(0) and W∗(1) cannot be row-
equivalent.
Proof. Extending (11) to the rows, those at position i in the
matrices W∗(b), for b = 0, 1, can be expressed as w
∗(b)
i =
q
(b)
i v
∗(b) mod p. We can impose q(0)0 = q
(1)
0 = 0 and, since
v
∗(0)
0 = v
∗(0)
1 = 0, we have
W∗(b) =


0 · · · 0
...
0
W˜∗(b)

 . (12)
where W˜(b) is an (r0 − 1) × (n0 − 1) matrix, whose i-
th row is defined as q
(b)
i
[
v
∗(b)
1 , v
∗(b)
2 , · · · , v∗(b)p−1
]
mod p =
q
(b)
i v˜
(b) mod p = ℑ
(
q
(b)
i , v˜
(b)
)
. If W˜∗(0) and W˜∗(1) are
row-equivalent, then each row of the former matrix must
correspond to a distinct row of the latter matrix. Because of
Theorem IV.2, this means that there must be a bijection Φ,
having domain and codomain equal to D =
{
1, 2, · · · , ⌊p2⌋},
such that
q
(0)
i v˜
(0) = Φ
(
q
(0)
i
)
v˜(1) mod p, ∀i ∈ [1; r0 − 1]. (13)
In particular, let us suppose that for i = α we have q
(0)
α =
1; then, v˜(0) = Φ(1)v˜(1) mod p. Obviously, the case of
Φ(1) = 1 is not allowed, since it means that v˜(0) = v˜(1).
By substitution into (13), we obtain
q
(0)
i Φ(1) mod p = Φ
(
q
(0)
i
)
, ∀i ∈ [1; r0 − 1]. (14)
Because of Theorem IV.3, there will always be (at least) one
value of i, say i′, such that Φ
(
q
(0)
i′
)
>
⌊
p
2
⌋
, thus proving that
such a bijection Φ cannot exist.
D. System parameters design
Being resistant to all the known reaction attacks, the pa-
rameters of the proposed cryptosystem must be designed
taking into account all the other known attacks. Among them,
the most dangerous ones are those based on information set
decoding (ISD), whose complexity can be estimated through
the analysis in [15]: given a code with length n, dimension
k and minimum distance w, the complexity of ISD can be
computed as CISD(n, k, w) ≈ 2−cw, with c = log2
(
1− k
n
)
.
In the case of a key recovery attack, an ISD algorithm can
be used to search for low-weight codewords in the dual of
the public code, which admits H as a valid generator matrix.
Indeed, because of its sparsity, the probability that the sum
of two (or more) of its rows (having weight n0) results in
a vector with weight ≤ n0 is negligible, so the rows of H
can be considered as the minimum weight codewords of the
dual code. Since there are r0 circulant block rows in H, the
opponent needs to determine r0 minimum weight codewords
of the dual code. An ISD algorithm can also be used to correct
the intentional error vector and perform decoding of the public
code. Thus, taking into account the speed-up due to the QC na-
ture of the code as in [10], the work factor (WF) of ISD-based
attacks can be estimated as WFKR =
r0
p
CISD(n, n−k, n0) for
key recovery and WFDA =
1√
p
CISD(n, k, t) for decoding.
Considering these expressions, we have designed three
system instances, for as many different security level (SL)
values. The theoretical bit flipping threshold estimation [9]
has been used to predict the error correcting capability of the
codes. The parameters of these instances are shown in Table I.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on
monomial codes, and considered a special class of such
codes that are robust against state-of-the-art reaction attacks
TABLE I
SYSTEM PARAMETERS FOR DIFFERENT SECURITY LEVELS
SL p n0 r0 t NW Ks(kB)
80 103 103 52 84 2538 34.14
128 137 137 69 132 2773 80.36
256 257 257 129 261 21684 530.45
exploiting decoding failures. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first McEliece cryptoystem variant that admits non
negligible DFR (i.e., > 2−SL) and, at the same time, hinders
attacks of this type. Even though the public keys are larger than
in classical QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based variants
(which, however, are vulnerable to reaction attacks), they
remain significantly smaller than those of Goppa code-based
variants, which use bounded-distance decoders and are not
subject to reaction attacks. For instance, a Goppa code-based
system achieving SL = 80 bits would require a systematic
public key of about 57 kB [13], which is much larger than
that of the proposed system instance with the same SL.
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